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1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999),
cert. dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000).
3. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schs., 197 F.3d 123 (4th
Cir. 1999).
4. Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schs., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228
(W.D.N.C. 1999), reversed sub nom. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 233 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 2000); opinion vacated and rehearing en banc
granted Jan. 17, 2001.
T O D A Y , more than at any time since 1954, North
Carolina school boards face a legal challenge to the tools
of desegregation, a challenge with the potential to undo
much of the educational diversity that has been
achieved since Brown v. Board of Education.1 The new
challenge has found its first decisive judicial expression
in three recent federal decisions, two of them rendered
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and
the third by a federal district court sitting in Charlotte:
Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board,2 Eisenberg v.
Montgomery County Public Schools,3 and Capacchione v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools.4 Together these deci-
sions suggest important new constitutional do’s and
don’ts for local school boards. The requirements depart
sharply from the rules laid down during the Brown era,
adherence to which now seems to be second nature for
administrators, teachers, students, and parents in public
schools throughout North Carolina and the nation.
In essence the new decisions forbid all school
boards (unless they are operating under federal deseg-
regation decrees) from considering race or ethnicity as
they assign children to public schools. The prohibition
holds even if it leads to resegregated schools, even if
most parents desire their children to attend racially di-
verse schools, and even if school boards are acting in
good faith to ensure that students receive the educa-
tional benefits that may come from a diverse school
environment.
The future of the new principles announced in
Tuttle, Eisenberg, and Capacchione remains uncertain.
To date, the Supreme Court has not agreed to consider
them. However, they might eventually require greater
real change in school attendance policies (and perhaps
also in faculty and staff assignment policies) than any
court decisions since Brown. Moreover, the Fourth
Circuit Court decisions set forth constitutional rules
that purport to bind every school district within the
circuit, which includes Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. So North
Carolinians cannot ignore them. Instead, every state
and local school board and every interested parent
must give them close attention.
Understanding this potential change requires that
interested citizens and public school officials review the
constitutional landscape of school assignment policies.
This article undertakes that review. First, it looks at the
legal requirements created by Brown and two important
cases that followed it—Green v. County School Board
of New Kent County5 in 1968 and Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education6 in 1971. Together the
three cases clarified the specific obligations resting on
5. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430
(1968).
6. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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all school systems found to have engaged in formal ra-
cial segregation. Next, the article examines three Su-
preme Court cases from the early 1990s that offer im-
portant new guidance on when and how school
districts under court order can gain release from fur-
ther judicial oversight.
The article then reviews the basics of another body
of law on the Equal Protection Clause that has emerged
in response to the debate over affirmative action in gov-
ernment contracting, public employment, and college
admissions. It explores how the Fourth Circuit Court in
Tuttle and Eisenberg has applied that body of law in a
new context—the assignment of children to elementary
and secondary public schools. Finally, because Tuttle
and Eisenberg constitute the law that now applies to
school districts in the Fourth Circuit, the last two por-
tions of the article assess the legal choices still open to
school boards and parents in North Carolina and de-
scribe some innovative steps being taken in Wake
County.
Desegregation: 1954 to 1990
In May 1954 the U.S. Supreme Court declared in
Brown that the South’s traditional “dual system” of
public education was inconsistent with the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 Brown
directly challenged the fundamental policy reflected in
public school segregation—the assignment of black and
white children to different schools.
After Brown, many Southern school boards ini-
tially chose to ignore or defy the Court and the Consti-
tution, invoking principles of state sovereignty and
long-standing racial traditions. After years of stubborn
resistance in some districts and grudging acquiescence
in others,8 most school districts eventually began to
implement school desegregation in earnest. Wide-
spread change did not begin, however, until 1965,
when Congress first conditioned eligibility for its mas-
sive education spending program under the Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Act on compliance with
the antidiscrimination provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.9
Even after desegregation began in earnest, pro-
tracted legal challenges continued in the 1960s and 1970s
as federal courts struggled to resolve many legal and edu-
cational debates over the meaning of Brown’s central in-
sight that “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal.” Not until 1968, in the watershed case of Green,
did the Supreme Court finally outline the changes that
would be necessary in every formerly segregated school
system. Every such system, it announced, bore an
“affirmative duty” to “take whatever steps might be nec-
essary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”
The Green Court specified at least six areas in which fed-
eral courts should measure progress toward a “unitary”
(desegregated) school system: (1) student enrollments,
(2) faculty assignments, (3) administrative and staff as-
signments, (4) transportation to schools, (5) extracur-
ricular activities, and (6) physical facilities.10
The Green Court rejected the school district’s ar-
gument that it had complied with its desegregation ob-
ligations when, in 1965, it adopted a “freedom of
choice” approach that permitted all parents—black or
white—to choose the public school their children
would attend. Offering school choice, the Court held,
did not suffice in the New Kent County school district
because that plan had not worked in practice to achieve
measurable student desegregation.11 Green made unmis-
takably clear that the Fourteenth Amendment requires
7. The Equal Protection Clause reads, “No State shall . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW
154–68 (3d rev. ed., New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1974) (recounting the
post–1954 campaign of state resistance to school desegregation, especially
in Virginia and the Deep South); WILLIAM H. CHAFEE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL
RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA AND THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR
FREEDOM 48–70 (paperback ed., New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1981) (de-
scribing North Carolina’s development and implementation of the Pearsall
Plan, which was designed to obstruct and delay school desegregation).
9. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d,
2000d.1. to 2000d.4 (1994). Before congressional enactment of Title VI,
which denies federal funds to any state or local authorities that discriminate
on the basis of race, only 2.25 percent of all African-American school-
children in the South were actually attending desegregated schools. James
R. Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53
VIRGINIA L. REV. 42, 44, n.9 (1967). See also Gary Orfield, Turning Back to
Segregation, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., New
York: New Press, 1996).
10. Green, 391 U.S. at 435.
11. “‘Freedom of choice’ is not a sacred talisman; it is only a means to
a constitutionally required end—the abolition of the system of segregation
and its effects. If the means prove effective, [freedom of choice] is accept-
able, but if it fails to undo segregation, other means must be used to achieve
this end. The school officials have the continuing duty to take whatever ac-
tion may be necessary to create a ‘unitary, non-racial system.’” Green, 391
U.S. at 440, quoting Bowman v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 333 (4th
Cir. 1967) (Sobeloff, J., concurring).
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tangible results—real racial integration—not merely
compliance with formal color-blind procedures.
In 1971 the Supreme Court again turned to the is-
sue of school desegregation in Swann, a famous decision
involving the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district.
Speaking for all nine justices, Chief Justice Warren
Burger held that federal courts were fully authorized to
require a variety of tools to achieve school desegrega-
tion, including (1) express racial percentages as initial
targets in assigning students to desegregating schools;
(2) express racial ratios of faculty and staff; (3) adminis-
trative “pairing” and “clustering” of two or more geo-
graphically distant residential areas to create racially
diverse student assignment zones; and (4) use of cross-
town busing or other transportation remedies, if neces-
sary. The Court acknowledged that school boards
would need to consider students’ races expressly as they
assigned students to schools in order to achieve mean-
ingful desegregation.12
In a companion case decided the same day as
Swann, the Court condemned a North Carolina state
statute that forbade assignment of children by race, lo-
cal school board plans relying on racial balances or ra-
tios, and use of involuntary busing.13 Again writing for a
unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger rebuffed North
Carolina’s argument that the Constitution required
color-blind student assignments and forbade any use of
racial balancing in public education. He described race-
conscious student assignments as an essential tool to
fulfill “the promise of Brown”:
Just as the race of students must be considered in deter-
mining whether a constitutional violation has oc-
curred, so also must race be considered in formulating
a remedy. To forbid, at this stage, all assignments made
on the basis of race would deprive school authorities of
the one tool absolutely essential to fulfillment of their
constitutional obligation to eliminate existing dual
school systems.14
During the twenty years that followed, Green and
Swann provided the basic guidelines for southern
school desegregation.
Some North Carolina school districts did not wait
to be sued. Clearly seeing the handwriting on the wall,
they submitted official forms devised by the federal De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW),
declaring themselves to be fully desegregated. In 1967
the civil rights functions of HEW were consolidated un-
der the Office for Civil Rights (OCR). Using more
specific guidelines and armed with greater personnel,
OCR moved beyond reliance on school board assur-
ances and began to perform actual reviews of school
compliance. OCR combined this approach with nego-
tiations with the local school districts. HEW gradually
began to move away from the pre–1964 focus of “shoot-
ing for court cases” and worked more cooperatively
with local districts to achieve compliance. Although ex-
act numbers are difficult to obtain, this comprehensive,
cooperative approach resulted in stronger ties with local
officials and, together with the strong Supreme Court
statements in Green and Swann, turned most districts
toward compliance in a spirit of cooperation.15
Desegregation in the 1990s
In the early 1990s, after nearly two decades of si-
lence, the Supreme Court returned to the issue of
southern school desegregation. By then, the principal
question was no longer, What must school boards
lawfully do to desegregate? but How long should judi-
cial supervision of school boards last? and When and
by what standards should a federal court determine
that a school district has completed its remedial tasks
and become, not a dual system, but a unitary system
at last? The Court’s first important decision on these
questions came in 1991 in Board of Education of Okla-
homa City v. Dowell. From the outset, sharp differ-
ences from earlier decisions were evident in Dowell’s
tone and emphasis. No longer unanimous—indeed,
sharply divided in a 5-3 opinion written by Chief Jus-
tice William Rehnquist—the Court stressed that fed-
eral supervision of local school systems had been
intended only as “a temporary measure to remedy
past discrimination” and that “important values” are
served by “local control of public school systems.”16
Although the Court eventually sent Dowell back to the
lower courts for further consideration, most court
watchers read the case as a signal that the era of
12. Swann, 402 U.S. at 25.
13. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45
(1971), referring to former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-176.1 (Supp. 1969).
14. North Carolina State Bd., 402 U.S. at 46.
15. See generally BERYL RADIN, IMPLEMENTATION, CHANGE, AND THE
FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (New York: Teachers College Press, 1977); U.S.
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HEW AND TITLE VI (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Gov’t Printing Office, 1970).
16. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247–48
(1991).
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court-ordered desegregation decrees might be draw-
ing to a close.
The next year the Court reinforced that impres-
sion in Freeman v. Pitts, a case arising in the suburban
Atlanta district of DeKalb County. The school board
in Freeman sought a declaration that it had overcome
its racial duality between 1979 and 1992 and now was
unitary. Such a declaration would permit the district’s
release from further judicial supervision. Measuring
the district against the six Green factors, the Supreme
Court held, for the first time, that a federal court
might properly release a school system from judicial
supervision one factor at a time. To merit such an out-
come, a school board must demonstrate that it has
sufficiently overcome racial problems in that one
area—such as student assignments or extracurricular
activities—even if racial disparities remain in another
area—such as faculty assignments.17
The Freeman Court also held that, if a school dis-
trict has diligently followed a court’s student assignment
orders for a significant period, a court might withdraw
further judicial supervision—even if schools’ racial
populations have subsequently become imbalanced—as
long as the emerging racial imbalance can plausibly be
traced not to the school board but to other causes, such
as residential decisions made by parents themselves.18
To aid lower federal courts in determining when
they should declare a school district to be unitary and
withdraw judicial supervision, the Freeman Court di-
rected them to weigh three new factors:
[1] whether there has been full and satisfactory compli-
ance with the [desegregation] decree in those aspects of
the system where supervision is to be withdrawn; [2]
whether retention of judicial controls is necessary or
practicable to achieve compliance with the decree in
other facets of the school system [e.g., other Green fac-
tors still under court supervision]; and [3] whether the
school district has demonstrated . . . its good-faith
commitment to the whole of the court’s decree and to
those provisions of the law and the Constitution that
were the predicate for judicial intervention in the first
instance.19
Read broadly, each of these factors subtly shifted
primary judicial attention from a practical concern
about concrete consequences of school board actions—
whether black and white children, teachers, and staff
were actually attending school together—toward a tech-
nical concern about formal compliance with court de-
crees. Freeman also reinforced the theme of local
control and the temporary nature of court supervision
that had been voiced in Dowell. The “end purpose” of
federal desegregation litigation, the Court emphasized,
must be “to remedy the violation and, in addition, to re-
store state and local authorities to the control of a
school system,” in order to restore the “vital national
tradition” of local school board autonomy.20
In 1995 in Missouri v. Jenkins (III), the Court ex-
panded on its new criteria for assessing unitary status
when it reviewed the progress of the Kansas City, Mis-
souri, school district toward unitary status.21 Jenkins III
stressed that courts did not need to require the elimina-
tion of racial disparities—for example, in test scores—
unless the plaintiffs could trace those disparities directly
to prior segregation, and that school districts had no
affirmative duty to implement educational policies
merely to encourage white suburban children to return
to urban school districts.
Together, Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins III have in-
vited the round of unitary status litigation that is cur-
rently under way throughout the nation, offering school
districts the prospect of a more successful trip to the
federal courthouse for release from judicial supervision.
Affirmative Action Principles
Applied to Desegregation
The Strict-Scrutiny Test
In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court began to
consider race in a very different context from school
desegregation. State legislatures, public employers, and
others had started creating voluntary programs of
affirmative action to extend some limited preferences
to African-Americans (or other traditionally disadvan-
taged groups) as compensation for prior decades of
wholesale discrimination. Eventually, unhappy whites
raised legal challenges to these programs, which were
17. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489–91 (1992).
18. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494–95. The Court reasoned that “[w]here
resegregation is a product not of state action [by the school board or an-
other governmental actor] but of private choices [by parents and other in-
dividuals], it does not have constitutional implications. It is beyond the
authority and beyond the practical ability of the federal courts to try to
counteract these kinds of continuous and massive demographic shifts. . . .
Residential housing choices, and their attendant effects on the racial com-
position of schools, present an ever-changing pattern, one difficult to ad-
dress through judicial remedies.” Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495.
19. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491.
20. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489–90.
21. Missouri v. Jenkins (III), 515 U.S. 70 (1995). The opinion is
called Jenkins III because the Supreme Court had twice before considered
other aspects of the Kansas City desegregation case.
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targeted at admission to public colleges and universi-
ties,22 public employment,23 and public contracting.24
The Supreme Court initially was uncertain about
how to address the new racial preferences because,
unlike traditional discriminatory legislation, they ap-
parently were intended not to punish or subordinate
disfavored racial groups but to compensate group
members for the legal and economic exclusion that
they had endured under slavery and Jim Crow segre-
gation. Nonetheless, in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Co., a watershed case decided in 1989, a majority of
five justices reasoned that all state or local policies that
employed race-conscious classifications should be
subjected to “strict judicial scrutiny.” Under strict
scrutiny, as Justice Sandra Day O’Connor clarified it,
federal courts should examine and invalidate any race-
conscious categories or factors, whether motivated by
racial hostility or goodwill, unless the state or local
agency could demonstrate that the racial categories (1)
would promote “compelling government interests”
and (2) were “narrowly tailored” (carefully drawn) to
achieve their compelling ends without causing undue
racial injury to innocent victims.25 This twofold con-
stitutional test has since been widely employed to
scrutinize race-conscious preferences that appear in a
variety of state and federal statutes.26
Extension of Croson’s Strict Scrutiny to
Student Assignment to Schools
In both of the Fourth Circuit Court’s recent opin-
ions, white parents challenged school board decisions
that depended in part on considerations of race or
ethnicity. In Arlington County, Virginia, the school
board designated one of its public kindergartens as a
“magnet” school, a school to which students were per-
mitted to apply for admission. There were more appli-
cants than available spaces, so the school district insti-
tuted a lottery system. To ensure educational and racial
diversity, however, the district structured the lottery to
give special weight to children from lower-income
backgrounds, children whose native language was not
English, and children with racial or ethnic minority
backgrounds.27 Parents of Grace Tuttle and other white
children who applied for, but were not accepted into,
the kindergarten class, brought suit, relying on the logic
of the affirmative action cases to argue that the school
district’s use of racial considerations violated the Equal
Protection Clause.
In the second Fourth Circuit case, the parents of
Jacob Eisenberg challenged the student transfer policy
of Montgomery County, Maryland. In reviewing stu-
dents’ requests for transfer from one school to another,
Montgomery school officials considered the race of the
students as well as the racial composition of the poten-
tial sending and receiving schools, to ensure that the
transfers would not upset the overall racial makeup of
schools within the district. The Eisenbergs sued, alleging
that their child would have been transferred to a math
and science magnet school but for his race.28
In both Tuttle and Eisenberg, the school districts
responded that affording children a racially diverse edu-
cational experience was itself a sufficiently compelling
goal to meet the standards of strict scrutiny. Therefore,
educational diversity should justify the use of race in
making student assignments.29 In the absence of
definitive guidance by the Supreme Court, the judicial
panels in both cases assumed that a school district’s in-
terest in educational diversity might well be compel-
ling.30 However, when they turned to the second branch
of the strict-scrutiny test—whether the means chosen
by the school board were narrowly tailored to minimize
22. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (dismissing with-
out deciding a challenge brought by an unsuccessful white applicant to the
University of Washington Law School); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (invalidating a rigid set-aside of 16 places among
100 exclusively for minority candidates seeking admission to a state medical
school).
23. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (invali-
dating a racial preference that protected minority teachers—who had been
hired under a voluntary affirmative action program—from layoffs during a
budgetary crunch); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (uphold-
ing a court order that required the Alabama Department of Public Safety to
promote qualified black candidates for 50 percent of future promotions, be-
cause of the long history of racial discrimination in the department).
24. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding a con-
gressional statute that required governmental recipients of federal public
works funds to spend at least 10 percent of the funds for goods or services
provided by qualified minority business enterprises).
25. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94
(1989).
26. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (ex-
tending the rationale of Croson beyond the state or local context to reach
federal programs).
27. Tuttle v. Arlington County School Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701 (4th
Cir. 1999).
28. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schs., 197 F.3d 123,
125–27 (4th Cir. 1999).
29. For an excellent discussion of the arguments in support of this
view, see Note, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions Programs
in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 112 HARVARD L. REV. 940, 948–
55 (1999).
30. See Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 704; Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 130. Although
the Supreme Court itself has never decided the question, in the celebrated
Bakke case in 1977, five justices who passed on medical school admission
policies at the University of California at Davis—although disagreeing
sharply on many other aspects of that case—did concur that the “attainment
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racial harm—they condemned the actions of the Ar-
lington and Montgomery County school boards as not
narrowly tailored enough, and they strongly suggested
that any school district plan that employs “racial bal-
ancing” is per se impermissible.31
The Fourth Circuit Court has recently considered
another appeal on these issues, brought by civil rights
plaintiffs and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board
itself. They challenged the September 1999 decision
rendered by a federal district court in Capacchione (1)
declaring that the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school dis-
trict had achieved unitary status, (2) dismissing the
district’s thirty-five-year desegregation lawsuit, (3) lift-
ing all court orders requiring desegregation, and (4) im-
posing a new order forbidding all further use of race or
ethnicity as factors in admitting children to the district’s
magnet schools.32
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board and the
original Swann attorneys argued that the district court
was wrong on all counts: (1) significant vestiges of
Charlotte-Mecklenburg’s prior segregation remained to
be corrected, and therefore a unitary status finding was
inappropriate; and (2) even if Charlotte-Mecklenburg
had become a unitary system, it might lawfully consider
race in making student assignments to achieve educa-
tional diversity and avoid resegregation of its schools.
In November 2000 a three-judge panel of the
Fourth Circuit Court, by a 2-1 vote, agreed with the
Swann plaintiffs that the Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools
had not yet been proven unitary in several respects, in-
cluding student assignment, school facilities, transporta-
tion policies, and student achievement. The panel
therefore remanded to the district court for further con-
sideration.33 Then, in January 2001, the full Fourth Cir-
cuit Court agreed to rehear the case. In that rehearing, it
will not be bound by the ruling of the panel.
Tuttle and Eisenberg in the Year 2001
Although serious questions exist about the legal
soundness of Tuttle and Eisenberg, the Fourth Circuit
Court has spoken in the two cases. Unless and until the
Supreme Court agrees to resolve this issue, the cases
supply binding legal precedent for every school district
in North Carolina and neighboring states. The practical
question, then, is, What latitude do the cases afford
North Carolina school districts in making future stu-
dent assignments?
Every school district must begin by considering its
legal status. If it is currently subject to an active desegre-
gation order, then not only Green and Swann but the
specific terms of court orders in its own case still pro-
vide the controlling legal authority for the district. Such
school boards may continue—indeed, they must con-
tinue—whatever race-conscious remedies have been
prescribed by earlier federal decrees until their school
districts have been declared unitary and released from
federal supervision. Nothing in Tuttle and Eisenberg
holds to the contrary. Nor has the Supreme Court ever
suggested that the school districts themselves are under
any constitutional obligation to seek release from exist-
ing court orders.
The Fourth Circuit Court’s new decisions have their
greatest immediate significance for school districts that
either were never subject to a desegregation decree or
now are considered unitary and released from federal ju-
dicial supervision. At a minimum, Tuttle and Eisenberg
forbid these districts from using race or ethnicity when
they assign students to magnet schools or evaluate stu-
dent transfer requests. Yet the logic of these cases may
prohibit a student assignment plan of any sort that might
directly employ racial or ethnic considerations.
Many questions remain unresolved by the Fourth
Circuit Court’s recent decisions. Do these cases forbid
all majority-to-minority (M-to-M) transfer programs,
under which school boards honor voluntary requests if
the students seek to transfer to a school in which their
race is in the minority? M-to-M programs differ from
the Montgomery County program in that they don’t
specify any concrete racial or ethnic goals or quotas.
They thereby avoid the racial balancing that Tuttle and
Eisenberg treated as almost unconstitutional per se. Yet
such policies do discourage increases in the relative size
of any racial group once it exceeds 50 percent of the
school’s population, and they operate by sorting trans-
fer applicants according to race. M-to-M programs
probably will have a difficult time surviving Tuttle and
Eisenberg.
Another unresolved question is whether these
cases forbid any consideration of race or ethnicity when
school boards draw or redraw their school attendance
boundaries. While forbidding school boards to use ra-
cial classifications in making individual student assign-
of a diverse student body . . . clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for
an institution of higher education.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 311–12, 314 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
31. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 707; Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 131–32.
32. Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 57 F. Supp. 2d
228, 232 (W.D.N.C. 1999).
33. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 233 F.3d 232 (4th
Cir. 2000).
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ments, Tuttle cited with favor three school zoning mea-
sures identified by an Arlington schools study commis-
sion that might well produce greater racial diversity: (1)
The board would assign a small geographic area to a
home school and fill the remaining spaces in that school
“by means of an unweighted random lottery from a . . .
geographic area [that] would presumably be selected so
that its residents would positively effect [sic] the diver-
sity of the school.” (2) The board would put the names
of every child in the school district into a lottery, ran-
domly select a certain number, and offer those ran-
domly selected the opportunity to enter a second lottery
comprising those who would like to attend a particular
magnet school. (3) “Each neighborhood school . . .
[would receive] a certain number of slots at each alter-
native [magnet] school.”34
Both the first and the third of these alternatives rest
on the unexamined (yet surely accurate) assumption
that different racial and ethnic groups typically live in
separate neighborhoods. The panel’s approving citation
of these alternative measures suggests that a high degree
of race-conscious behavior in developing neighborhood
feeder patterns for elementary and secondary schools
may be acceptable, as long as the formal criteria finally
adopted are racially neutral.35 This distinction between
direct and racially explicit plans, on the one hand, and
indirect but racially conscious plans, on the other hand,
seems consistent with constitutional principles currently
emerging in the voting rights/redistricting area. The Su-
preme Court has recently acknowledged that “a legisla-
ture may be conscious of the voters’ races [when it
engages in redistricting] without using race as a basis for
assigning voters to districts,” as long as race does not be-
come the “dominant and controlling consideration.”36
In sum, school boards desiring to retain some de-
gree of racial diversity probably may do so if (1) they
avoid formal criteria that expressly look to race or
ethnicity (such as racial goals or quotas for individual
schools) and (2) they avoid actual practices in which
race becomes “the dominant and controlling consider-
ation” in making student assignments. Yet it seems im-
plausible that the current Fourth Circuit Court would
approve aggressive pairing and clustering approaches
such as those upheld in Swann in 1971—joining two or
more geographically noncontiguous and racially diverse
neighborhoods to create a single attendance zone—if
the only explanation for the selection of those neighbor-
hoods is their racial composition.37
Beyond student assignment policies, Tuttle and
Eisenberg have grave implications for other administra-
tive practices common in many North Carolina school
districts. Some districts expressly consider race or
ethnicity in assigning teachers or administrative person-
nel to various schools; they may well see future chal-
lenges to those practices. The Fourth Circuit Court’s
constitutional rationale appears broad enough to throw
into question all assignment policies for faculty, admin-
istrators, or other school personnel that expressly rely
on racial considerations. Indeed, in the related area of
teacher dismissal policies, both the Supreme Court and
other circuits have disapproved of layoff procedures
employing racial considerations.38 Further, at least in
terms of layoffs, the Supreme Court has rejected the ar-
gument that the need of schoolchildren for teacher role
models of different racial backgrounds is sufficient to
withstand strict scrutiny.39
37. The permissibility of considering race in drawing school atten-
dance zones is currently the object of litigation in Boston’s Children First v.
Boston School Comm., 62 F. Supp. 2d 2247 (D. Mass. 1999) (denying plain-
tiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction against the Boston School
Committee’s use of race in creating school attendance zones, reasoning that
the record was insufficient to determine whether plaintiffs were likely to
prevail on the merits); Boston’s Children First, 98 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D. Mass.
2000) (denying defendant school committee’s motion to dismiss).
38. See Taxman v. Board of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd
Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that a school district violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination, when
it used race as a factor in choosing which of two qualified teachers it would
lay off during a budgetary crisis, and suggesting that, had the court decided
the question under the Equal Protection Clause, rather than Title VII, it
nonetheless would not have sanctioned the school district’s use of racial dis-
tinctions). See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)
(holding that a school board policy of protecting minority teachers with less
seniority than some white teachers from being laid off during a budgetary
crisis, because of their race, violated the Equal Protection Clause).
39. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275 (“the role model theory . . . has no logi-
cal stopping point”) (Powell, J.).
34. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706, n.11, quoting the Arlington County
commission’s report.
35. School boards may risk a constitutional violation, however, if
they make it clear that their sole underlying intent or purpose is to achieve,
indirectly, the racial balancing that the Fourth Circuit Court has con-
demned as a direct means of furthering educational diversity. The Supreme
Court has long held that even if states’ or localities’ statutes or policies are
racially neutral on their face, they violate the Equal Protection Clause if they
were adopted or are administered with the intent to discriminate invidi-
ously. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Yet, to a considerable extent, the ratio-
nale of Tuttle and Eisenberg is internally inconsistent. If a school board’s
goal to achieve educational diversity is constitutionally permissible, indeed
even compelling for purposes of strict scrutiny (as both Tuttle and Eisenberg
assume), then why is selecting race-conscious methods of student assign-
ment to achieve this compelling end unconstitutional?
36. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996).
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The Wake County Experiment
In light of Tuttle and Eisenberg, Wake County has
chosen to discard all reliance on race as a factor in mak-
ing its student assignments, while actively seeking student
diversity through consideration of both family socio-
economic status and student academic performance.
Wake County’s previous use of magnet programs and
racial guidelines enabled it to achieve extensive desegre-
gation; according to a recent study, only 21 percent of
Wake County’s black students, far less than the national
average of 70 percent, were in schools with a total minor-
ity enrollment above 50 percent.40
Under the new Wake County plan, the district is
committed to having no school in which (1) more than
40 percent of the children are eligible for free or reduced-
price school lunches (such eligibility being a widely em-
ployed indicator of lower family income) or (2) more
than 25 percent of the students score below grade level
(averaged over two years).41 The plan does not assign
children on the basis of their individual circumstances.
Instead, if a school’s population exceeds the socioeco-
nomic or achievement ceiling set by the board, children
living in neighborhoods where a disproportionate per-
centage are either low-performing or of low socio-
economic status will be moved to other schools.
Although some of the same children targeted under
a race-conscious plan (many of them African-American)
will be transferred under this new, race-neutral plan (be-
cause they are from lower-income families and/or have
low test scores), the two approaches are not equivalent.
Indeed, the new approach will affect different groups of
both white and minority students:
About 38 percent of Wake’s minority students will
no longer be automatically targeted for integration. . . .
And about 13 percent of the district’s white students . . .
will be among those who could be reassigned to help
the schools meet their new, colorblind definition of di-
versity.42
The continuing partial overlap is understandable,
for African-American families have disproportionately
lower incomes than white families do, not only in North
Carolina but in the nation as a whole.43 Moreover, on
average, African-American children lag behind white
children in performance on standardized tests, again,
not only in North Carolina but nationwide.44
Is Wake County’s new plan lawful? Can it sur-
vive constitutional challenge? Reflection on three sub-
questions points to the same conclusion: yes.
1. Why should Wake County’s reliance on socio-
economic status or student achievement have any better
success in withstanding Equal Protection Clause review
than race did under the plans in Tuttle and Eisenberg?
The Supreme Court long ago reserved the exacting
form of strict scrutiny employed by the Fourth Circuit
Court in Tuttle and Eisenberg for statutes that draw dis-
40. For a more comprehensive examination of the Wake County
plan, see Elizabeth Jean Bower, Answering the Call: Wake County’s Commit-
ment to Diversity in Education, 78 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 2026,
2026 (2000); see also Todd Silberman, Schools Facing Diversity Dilemma,
RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Dec. 26, 1999, at 1A; Tim Simmons, School
Plan Signals New Chapter in Integration, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Jan.
16, 2000, at 1A.
41. See WAKE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM, STUDENT ASSIGNMENT
§ 6200 D, E, available at http://www.wcpss.net/policy_files/policy_pdfs/
6000_series.pdf (visited February 13, 2001). The pertinent provisions of the
student assignment plan read as follows:
All of the following factors, not in priority order, will be used in the
development of the annual student assignment plan:
A. Instructional program; e.g., magnet programs, special education,
ESL, etc.
B. Adherence to K–5, 6–8, 9–12 grade organization.
C. Facility utilization, including crowding (projected enrollment
should be between 85% and 115% of approved campus capacity).
New schools may operate with less than 85% of capacity enrolled
if some grade levels will not be assigned during the first year or if
significant growth is anticipated in the following years.
D. Diversity in student achievement (percentage of students scoring
below grade level should be no higher than 25%, averaged across
a two-year period). Schools with more than 25% of students be-
low grade level will receive an instructional review to ascertain the
reasons for the low achievement; improvement trends will be
considered in deciding whether to address this issue in develop-
ment of the assignment plan.
E. Diversity in socioeconomic status (percentage of students eligible
for free or reduced price lunch will be no higher than 40%).
Schools with more than 40% of students eligible for free or re-
duced price lunch will receive an instructional review; improve-
ment trends will be considered in deciding whether to address
this issue in development of the assignment plan.
F. Stability (the percentage of students who will remain at the same
school).
G. Proximity (no student will travel more than the maximum time
established by board policy).
42. Simmons, School Plan Signals, at 1A.
43. CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POVERTY & INCOME
TRENDS: 1998, at 12–15 (Washington, D.C.: the Center, Mar. 2000) (show-
ing that, since at least 1970, African-American and Hispanic families have
experienced poverty at far higher rates than white families have).
44. See NORTH CAROLINA JUSTICE & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
CENTER, EXPOSING THE GAP: WHY MINORITY STUDENTS ARE BEING LEFT
BEHIND IN NORTH CAROLINA’S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 26, 4 (Raleigh, N.C.:
the Center, Jan. 2000) (revealing an average gap of 30.9 points between Af-
rican-American and white students in grades 3–8 in 1998–99 on state end-
of-grade tests in reading and in mathematics; and a statewide average
overall gap in both reading and mathematics of 30.7 points—79.2 for
whites and 48.5 for African-Americans). See generally THE BLACK-WHITE
TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Inst. Press, 1998) (analyzing the origins of, the historical
extent of, alternative explanations for, and the policies that might over-
come, the racial achievement-score gap).
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tinctions based on race, ethnicity, or national origin,
and for those that “substantially burden” a small cat-
egory of so-called fundamental rights. The Court has
specifically held that education is not one of those fun-
damental rights and that statutes making distinctions
based on wealth or poverty (such as the socioeconomic
factor adopted by Wake County) should not receive
strict judicial review.45 Indeed, most other legislative
choices are reviewed under the “rational basis” test, a
standard so remarkably lenient that only a handful of
plaintiffs have ever succeeded in having statutes invali-
dated as unconstitutional.46
Both of Wake County’s chosen factors are de-
signed to encourage educational diversity—surely a le-
gitimate end, since the Fourth Circuit Court assumed
it to be “compelling” in Tuttle and Eisenberg—and to
improve children’s academic performance. Moreover,
the two factors chosen by the school board to attain
these important ends are closely and substantially re-
lated to those ends. A consistent body of empirical re-
search has proven that students in “high poverty”
schools (those with very high percentages of children
from low-income families) tend to perform at lower
academic levels—irrespective of their own family’s
economic circumstances—than children in “low pov-
erty” schools do.47 Wake County’s new attention to the
socioeconomic composition of its schools therefore
should not only increase the diversity of its schools’
student bodies but also eliminate all high-poverty
schools in Wake County and thereby improve the av-
erage educational performance of children in formerly
high-poverty schools.
The other educational strategy adopted by the
Wake County school board—not permitting a concen-
tration of low-performing students in any schools—
will tend to ensure that all schools have a majority of
high-achieving students and that neither teachers nor
parents nor other students will be inclined to flee from
particular schools because of the students’ disappoint-
ing performance on state standardized tests. These are
manifestly reasonable means to achieve worthy and
important educational ends.
2. Isn’t this plan merely a subterfuge? Hasn’t Wake
County kept its racial assignment system under another
name?
The question is an important one, for the Su-
preme Court has long held that even if a statute or an
administrative practice appears to be racially neutral on
its face, it still may violate the Equal Protection Clause
if it was adopted, or is administered, with a racial moti-
vation.48 Yet even if the impact of a statute falls more
heavily on one race than on another, the federal courts
will not invalidate the statute on Equal Protection
Clause grounds as long as it is not motivated (solely or
principally) by racial considerations. The Wake County
plan, as noted earlier, has strong nonracial justifications
in addition to the legitimate interest in racial diversity.
The plan should improve academic performance, avoid
the concentration of either poorly performing or eco-
nomically needy children in a few disfavored schools,
and increase the overall diversity of every school. Other
school districts that wish to follow the Wake County
approach should likewise be sure to establish a clear
record—in their school board debates, in their written
policies, and in their administration of those policies—
substantiating these other, nonracial goals.
45. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 29 (1973) (holding that legislative classifications that accept differ-
ences in the property wealth or poverty of various school districts do not
normally invoke strict judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause,
even if those differences create disparities in education); Kadrmas v.
Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (noting that the Court
has “previously rejected the suggestion that statutes having different effects
on the wealthy and the poor should on that account alone be subjected to
strict equal protection scrutiny” and that the Court had never “accepted the
proposition that education is a ‘fundamental right’ . . . which should trigger
strict scrutiny”).
46. Under the rational-basis review, a state need show only that its
underlying goal is at least “legitimate” and that its chosen means might
“conceivably” further the end. As Justice O’Connor rephrased the standard,
“Social and economic legislation . . . ‘carries with it a presumption of ratio-
nality that can only be overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness and ir-
rationality.’” Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 462, quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S.
314, 331–32 (1981). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 1439–46 (2d ed., Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1988)
(reviewing the cases and noting the federal judiciary’s “remarkable defer-
ence to state objectives” in most instances).
47. See MARY KENNEDY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., POVERTY,
ACHIEVEMENT AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF COMPENSATORY EDUCATION SER-
VICES 22 (1986) (documenting the adverse relationship between high levels
of school poverty and lower average school achievement); LAURA LIPPMAN
ET AL., URBAN SCHOOLS: THE CHALLENGE OF LOCATION AND POVERTY x–xii
(1996) (reporting that both urban location and high school-poverty con-
centration were associated with lower academic performance); U.S. DEP’T
OF EDUC., PROSPECTS: FINAL REPORT ON STUDENT OUTCOMES at v, 73
(Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Associates, 1997) (reporting extensive research re-
vealing that “school poverty concentration is associated with lower aca-
demic performance”); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCHOOL POVERTY AND ACA-
DEMIC PERFORMANCE: NAEP ACHIEVEMENT IN HIGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS
3–5 (Washington, D.C.: USDOE, 1998) (noting the relationship between
high percentages of lower-income children within schools and the lower av-
erage academic performance by children in those schools on mathematics
and reading achievement tests administered by the National Assessment of
Educational Progress). Moreover, there is evidence that racial integration
alone may improve the academic performance of minority children.
48. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 351 (1886).
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3. What about the North Carolina Constitution? Didn’t
the North Carolina Supreme Court recently hold in
Leandro v. State49 that every student has the state consti-
tutional right to a “sound basic education”? Isn’t that
right violated by the Wake County plan?
North Carolina schoolchildren do indeed have a
newly minted “fundamental right” to a sound basic
education. Yet in Leandro itself, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court declined to extend the weapon of strict ju-
dicial scrutiny to every plaintiff unhappy about some
local educational decision. Instead, it instructed state
courts to afford “every reasonable deference” to local
educational officials and to strike a statute or a policy
only if a plaintiff could make “a clear showing” that he
or she was being deprived of a sound basic education.50
Plausible social science evidence suggests that Wake
County’s student assignment plan will improve the
quality of education that many students receive. More-
over, as already explained, students have no general
right to insist on attendance at any particular school
or to challenge the assignments made by local school
authorities.51
The Uncertain Future of
Student Assignments
Although the Wake County approach seems legally
sound, its political and educational future remains
open. In March 2000 the PTA co-presidents at one
Wake County elementary school wrote all parents, urg-
ing them to oppose the proposed transfer of sixty-eight
low-income and low-performing students to their
school from another neighborhood. All but one of the
transferring students would be African-American. One
49. See Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997). See also
John Charles Boger, Leandro v. State—A New Era in Educational Reform?,
POPULAR GOVERNMENT, Spring 1998, at 2.
50. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261.
51. See, e.g., In re United States ex rel. Missouri State High Sch. Ac-
tivities Ass’n, 682 F.2d 147, 152 (8th Cir. 1982) (observing that “[s]tudents
have no indefeasible right to associate through choice of school. Mandatory
assignment to public schools based on place of residence or other factors is
clearly permissible”); Wharton v. Abbeville School Dist. No. 60, 608 F.
Supp. 70, 76 (D. S. C. 1984) (noting that plaintiffs in that school desegrega-
tion case had “presented no independent source, either in the law of South
Carolina, or otherwise, which has granted to them a legitimate claim of en-
titlement to attend a particular school”); Citizens Against Mandatory Bus-
sing v. Palmason, 495 P.2d 657, 663 (1972); cf. Bronson v. Board of Educ. of
City School District, 550 F. Supp. 941, 959 (S. D. Ohio 1982) (noting that
“Ohio law . . . does not confer a right upon pupils to attend a specific
school, even if they were previously assigned thereto”), modified and aff’d on
other grounds, 525 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1975).
52. See T. Keung Hui, School Plan Draws Foes, RALEIGH NEWS & OB-
SERVER, Apr. 7, 2000, at B1; T. Keung Hui, Turned Out, Turned Away, RA-
LEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, May 6, 2000, at A1 (describing the circumstances
of the children to be moved, most of whom live in lower-income apart-
ments with single working mothers, 81 percent of whom receive free or re-
duced-price school lunches, and 52 percent of whom have scored below
grade level on state end-of-grade tests).
53. Hui, Turned Out, at A1.
co-president, a white, insisted, “I’m not a racist. . . . I’m
trying to protect my neighborhood school.” The letter
informed parents that there never had been a need for
a Title I Basic Skills reading program at their school,
though the new students would likely need those ser-
vices. The white co-president added, “[I]f the school’s
test scores drop [because of the transferring students],
neighborhood parents would flee” and neighborhood
property values might drop. The controversy prompted
by the letters has apparently led many parents of the
transferring children to approach the local chapter of
the National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People, seeking to forestall the move on the
ground that the children should not be placed in a
school where they are not welcome.52
Meanwhile, a countywide Gallup poll revealed that
a sizable minority of Wake County residents, 35.5 per-
cent, want to limit the number of low-performing chil-
dren being moved and 24.5 percent favor limiting the
number of low-income students. Yet a majority support
the new plan. Indeed, the principal of the elementary
school at issue in the letter described earlier has met
with the parents of children who will be transferring,
stating, “They will be treated fairly. They will be loved
like every other child who goes [here].”53
Obviously one key to success will be strong, wise
educational leadership. Despite the potential for paren-
tal fears and protectiveness, the new plan aims to pre-
vent the emergence of “winner” and “loser” schools. As
long as each school contains a relatively similar mix of
high-, middle-, and low-income children, as well as
children performing at all academic levels, no parent
anywhere in the system need conclude that his or her
child is being singled out for disadvantage.
Although Wake County is a pioneer in North
Carolina, it is not the first school district nationally to
adopt or consider such an approach. Apparently the
first plan was adopted in 1992 in La Crosse, Wisconsin,
a city of 50,000. The school board there set out to end
the wide disparities in concentrations of poverty, rang-
ing from 4 percent in some schools to 68 percent in oth-
ers. The district’s plan set a 45 percent ceiling and a 15
percent floor on the proportion of low-income children
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in any school. As in Wake County, the socioeconomic
status of families in La Crosse was closely related to ra-
cial and ethnic background, although the predominant
racial minority was not African-Americans (who ac-
counted for only 1 or 2 percent of La Crosse’s popula-
tion) but Hmong refugees from Southeast Asia (who
made up about 12 percent of the district’s popula-
tion).54 Although the La Crosse plan has become an ac-
cepted feature of the school system and remains in place
in 2000, four school board members lost their positions
when voters in the early years voted against them and
even organized a recall election because of anger at their
support for the plan.55
Similar proposals have occasionally been consid-
ered in other cities, but none have yet been adopted. For
example, in 1998 a task force of teachers in Louisville,
Kentucky, proposed a student assignment plan that
would have considered socioeconomic status and other
characteristics of individual children that put them at
risk for failure. The task force’s proposal was not ap-
proved by the school board, however.56 In the late
1990s, San Francisco’s school board fashioned a plan
that would have weighed students’ socioeconomic sta-
tus, test scores, English-language ability, and racial or
ethnic background in making assignments. However, in
December 1999, in a ruling similar to Tuttle and
Eisenberg, a federal judge held that the school board
could not consider children’s race and ethnicity. The
school board abandoned the entire plan rather than
proceed in reliance only on students’ socioeconomic
backgrounds and prior achievement.57
Conclusion
Very few North Carolinians would willingly return
to the pre–1954 era of legally segregated schooling. Yet
the Fourth Circuit Court has deprived local school
boards of the most straightforward and direct means of
ensuring that every child learns about children of other
racial and ethnic backgrounds as an indispensable part
of his or her socialization in public schools. North
Carolinians must await the inevitable moment when the
Supreme Court decides whether the Fourth Circuit
Court’s commitment to an abstract form of color-
blindness will prevail or whether school boards in the
Fourth Circuit again will be allowed to consider race
and ethnic background in making student assignments
to achieve educational diversity. In the meantime the
experiment under way in Wake County may point to-
ward a new and educationally superior means of achiev-
ing similar educational goals. 
54. See Peter Schmidt, La Crosse to Push Ahead with Income-Based
Busing Plan, EDUCATION WEEK, Aug. 5, 1992, available at http://
www.edweek.com/ew/vol-11/40crosse.h11; Peter Schmidt, District Proposes
Assigning Pupils Based on Income, EDUCATION WEEK, Oct. 30, 1991, avail-
able at http://www.edweek.com/ew/1991/09wis.h11.
55. Robert C. Johnston, N.C. District to Integrate by Income, EDUCA-
TION WEEK, Apr. 26, 2000, at 1.
56. See Andrew Trotter, Teachers Propose Integrating Schools by Socio-
economic Status, EDUCATION WEEK, Dec. 2, 1998, available at http://
www.edweek.com/ew/1998/14jefco.h18.
57. See Nanette Asimov, S.F. District Ok[ay]s Race-Neutral School
Plan, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 7, 2000, available at http://
www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2000/01/07
/MN97233.DTL.
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